It Was All About ​“Blue”

What happened last Tuesday? Number-cruncher and political junkie Jason Paul breaks it down:

The election in Connecticut last Tuesday is more a testament to Connecticut’s ultimately Blue nature than it is to pretty much any other factor. It is also a statement that although money talks in many areas of life, cash alone (particularly Linda McMahon’s) is not able to conquer the longstanding social and cultural factors that shape our politics. Consider that McMahon and Ann Brickley nearly ran even in the First U.S. Congressional District. Ultimately voter identification with the Democratic perspective allowed the party to sweep the races on the statewide ballot. We can explain most Democratic losses in the legislature by looking to weakness at the top of the ticket in those districts.

1. John Kerry’s and Al Gore’s Connecticut.

When the votes were totaled, Richard Blumenthal defeated Linda McMahon in the U.S. Senate race by a 12-point margin incredibly similar to John Kerry’s advantage over George Bush six years earlier. Most towns in the Senate race followed a pattern very similar to that of the 2004 presidential election. The cities — greater New Haven and southeastern Connecticut — were more for Blumenthal. Hartford’s outer suburbs were more for McMahon as were higher-income suburbs and greater Torrington. Despite slight variations, the electorate basically performed along simple partisan lines. Connecticut voters give the current President a plus-10 percent job approval rating (one point below the Kerry margin and two points less than the Blumenthal win). We shouldn’t be surprised that voters with these partisan perceptions gave Blumenthal and almost all the Democrats easy victories.

2. The trends don’t stop at the top.

Lost in the focus on those who apparently voted for Blumenthal and Republican gubernatorial candidate Tom Foley, is the otherwise dramatic decrease in ticket splitting compared to previous years. U.S. Rep. John Larson saw his performance drop to the percentage of the vote that Kerry got. (Larson 61percent in his district, Kerry 60 percent.) Compare this to the 2004 results, when Larson outran Kerry by 13 percent, and the 2008 results, when Larson out-ran Obama by six points.

U.S. Rep. Jim Himes also won at about Kerry’s percentage in his district. (Himes 53 percent, Kerry 52% percent.) 

The pattern is even more noteworthy if we turn our attention to the under ticket. In recent elections, Democratic candidates for constitutional offices other than governor have run far ahead of the top of the ticket. Of course, some of these strong performances were easy victories by popular incumbents. But overall we saw voters choosing individual Democratic candidates, even while voting for Governors Rowland and Rell. By 2010, however, the strongest indicator of Democratic performance for these under ticket races is the baseline we could draw from the Kerry and Gore baseline.

For example, Treasurer Denise Nappier’s 2010 percentage of the vote at 55.6 percent fell almost as much from 2006 as Democratic gubernatorial candidate Dan Malloy’s percentage improved over John DeStefano’s. U.S. Rep. Joe Courtney was able to hold 60 percent and thus outperform the ticket, but even he fell from the 66 percent he received in 2008, suggesting a reduced ability to garner McCain voters. U.S. Rep. Chris Murphy ran almost as strongly ahead (running a point better than the average of Kerry and Obama in his district). U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro also ran strong but even she returned to the 2008 Obama level for her district, leaving the 70s that she used to receive behind her.

3. The State Rep. and Senate Dem losses basically fell into the same categories.

There is no space here to go district by district, but a quick review will demonstrate that with a few exceptions, such as candidates with personal problems, the Democrats losses in legislative districts tracked poor performance at the top of the ticket far more than any variation in candidate quality. In short, voters are increasingly drawn to core identification rather than focusing on the details of particular races.

4. The cities (but not just the big three) saved Dan Malloy

For reasons to be explored at a later time, the governor’s race and only the governor’s race proved the place where the trend broke. A different
model explains how Malloy made it across the finish line. Without doubt, Malloy is incredibly fortunate to be governor-elect. If one looks at the towns that best fit the results from the 2002 – 2008 cycles (South Windsor being near the best) Dan Malloy failed to win any of them. He actually ran a decent percentage behind what might have been expected in a certain number of towns in projections that would have placed the race even. Overall Dan Malloy won only 41 of 169 towns.

So what saved him? Turnout was up in Democratic base areas and otherwise flat across the state. Listed below are the 15 towns where Malloy was able to perform at nearly or better than the Kerry percentage: Bloomfield, Hartford, Windsor, Mansfield, New London, Windham, Hamden, New Haven, Stratford, West Haven, Bridgeport, Stamford, Kent, New Britain and Waterbury. 

What is remarkable is that statewide voter turnout increased by 19,039 from 2006 and 10,876 of these votes were from these 15 towns. Put another way turnout was up 1.7 percent overall but up 5.2 percent across these base municipalities.

Turnout was in fact down across most of the 2nd District (37/63 towns) and large parts of the 1st (10/27 towns), parts of the 3rd (8/25 towns) and only in small spots in the 4th and 5th. Only the 2nd district experienced an overall drop in turnout. Given these small variations, it matters greatly that the base towns gave Malloy a plurality of 81,209 votes, aided by the 10,876 additional voters. The plurality from new voters either provided the margin of victory or surely provided the margin to avoid a recount. Of some note is that outside the big three cities (Hartford, New Haven and Bridgeport), Malloy racked up a 35,679 vote margin in the other base towns on a turnout increase of 5,662. This means that 44 percent of his margin from his 15 base towns came from outside the big three cities. Malloy won because his base towns outperformed what would normally be expected.

Conclusion.

Higher city turnout combined with a return of some Democrats from 2004 permitted Connecticut Democrats to overcome the slight losses in a combination of rural and affluent towns and thus to celebrate arguably the best night of any Democratic Party in the country.